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42 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
INTRODUCTION
The distinction between “binding” and “persuasive” authority and
normativity1 constitutes a good starting point for this Article’s overall
argument on the concept of precedent as it relates to overruling. Only
binding authority and normativity, usually accompanied by sanctions that
support their enforcement, constitute law; persuasion, instead, falls by and
large within the realm of morality. In that light, one may think that in the
United States only binding authority deserves the labels “stare decisis” and
“precedent,”2 given that in a common law system stare decisis is a legal
principle and precedents are a source of law. The quintessential form of
precedent, “vertical” precedent,3 is strictly binding and hence clearly legal.
But precedent and the strength of its authority can be broken down further:
there is also a “horizontal” dimension of stare decisis that is not binding to
other courts, and it too deserves the name “precedent.” The terms and
concepts “horizontal stare decisis” and “horizontal precedent” are far from
nonsensical; they enrich the discussion of precedent, especially when they
are coupled and contrasted with “vertical stare decisis” and “vertical
precedent.” 
Vertical stare decisis, or vertical precedent, is the obligation of lower
courts to follow the decisions of the higher courts within the hierarchical
structure.4 With vertical stare decisis, the court bound and the court
binding are always different courts located at different levels of the judicial
1. By “normativity” in this Article we mean “bindingness” and “guiding
force,” two concepts closely related to “authority.”
2. Reflecting common use, the Black’s Law Dictionary refers to “stare
decisis” as “[t]he doctrine of precedent.” Stare decisis, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). We, too, treat them as synonyms at least in some
contexts.
3. There are, conversely, those that would reserve the term “stare decisis”
for the horizontal dimension, as they see in the vertical dimension not so much as 
“stare decisis” but rather as a natural consequence of the hierarchical court system,
somewhat independent from the common law style system. RANDY J. KOZEL,
SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF PRECEDENT 23 (2017) (contrasting the
“absoluteness of vertical precedent” with what we call here “horizontal stare
decisis”).
4. See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court 
Precedents, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 818 (1994).
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432021] OVERRULING LOUISIANA
system.5 For example, under the doctrine of vertical stare decisis, the Court
of Appeals is bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court. In common
law jurisdictions,6 including the United States,7 this obligation of lower
courts is of a legal nature. Even though lower courts sometimes attempt to
escape vertical precedent,8 once they identify a precedent and find it to be
on point, the precedent controls the lower court as legislation would. In
the words of Justice Kavanaugh in Ramos v. Louisiana, “[T]he state courts
and the other federal courts have a constitutional obligation to follow a
precedent of this Court unless and until it is overruled by this Court.”9 In
civil law jurisdictions, precedent is treated differently. Because legislation
is understood as the main source of law in a civil law jurisdiction, vertical
“precedents” are to the common law what “statutes” are to the civil
law10—legally binding rules.
Horizontal stare decisis, or horizontal precedent, is the obligation of a 
court to follow its own prior decisions. In other words, with horizontal
stare decisis, the court bound and the court binding share the same ranking
in the judicial system. Indeed, they are the same court at two different
points in time. For example, under horizontal stare decisis the Supreme
Court is bound by its own precedents, though “bound” in a way
significantly different from the way the Supreme Court binds lower courts
with vertical stare decisis. Horizontal stare decisis is a softer, policy-laden
question, closer to persuasive authority—a matter of “respect.”11 At the
horizontal level, this respect results in a general principle, bindingness,
5. Santiago Legarre, Precedent in Argentine Law, 57 LOY. L. REV. 781, 784 
(2011) (discussing vertical stare decisis and distinguishing it from horizontal
precedent).
6. In some civil law jurisdictions, such as Argentina, there is a similar, but
different, doctrine of “soft vertical precedent.” See Santiago Legarre &
Christopher R. Handy, A Civil Law State in a Common Law Nation, a Civil Law
Nation with a Common Law Touch: Judicial Review and Precedent in Louisiana
and Argentina, 95 TUL. L. REV. 445 (2021).
7. One notable exception in some instances is Louisiana. See Mary Garvey
Algero, The Sources of Law and the Value of Precedent: A Comparative and
Empirical Study of a Civil Law State in a Common Law Nation, 65 LA. L. REV.
775 (2005).
8. The most important technique is distinguishing cases based on facts. See
HARRY W. JONES, JOHN M. KERNOCHAN & ARTHUR W. MURPHY, LEGAL 
METHOD: CASES AND MATERIALS 132 (1980).
9. Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1416 n.5 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring in part).
10. See generally CUETO RÚA, JUDICIAL METHODS OF INTERPRETATION OF
THE LAW (1981).
11. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1416 n.5 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part).
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44 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
and an exception, overruling. Together, the principle and exception
translate into a soft obligation to observe horizontal stare decisis that is 
ripe for policy considerations.
The soft nature of horizontal stare decisis results in a power of
overruling that is absent in vertical stare decisis. However, it is not the
possibility of overruling precedent that makes horizontal stare decisis
weaker. Because horizontal stare decisis is more policy laden, it needs this
flexibility that includes the possibility of overruling. Something analogous
happens with vertical stare decisis: it is not hard law because it sanctions
departure; rather it is because of its hard nature that vertical stare decisis
brings with it, or needs, a sanction against non-compliance. So with
vertical stare decisis it is true that in the absence of compliance by the
lower court, the higher court will likely overturn the lower court’s
decision. This works as a kind of sanction against the non-complying
court12 that is absent in horizontal stare decisis.
One could question the use of the terms “horizontal stare decisis” and
“horizontal precedent” because of this weaker, softer binding force at the
horizontal level. Horizontal stare decisis and precedent are closer to the 
persuasive or to the world of moral guidelines—the domain of what is
“wise”13 and to some uncertain extent optional.14 Nevertheless, as this
Article will attempt to show, the authority of horizontal precedent is not
merely persuasive. There are shades of normativity and, consequently,
degrees of bindingness.15 Horizontal precedent is in reality somewhere
within the range of the obligatory, closer to a rule than to the absence of
any rule at all. Vertical stare decisis and precedent, in contrast, are a matter
of hard law, not a matter of policy.
12. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 10–11, 16, 213, 217–18 (Oxford
U. Press, 2d ed. 1994).
13. We borrow this use of the term “wise” from Justice Brandeis’s dissent in
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932), discussed infra
Section II.A.
14. Professor Re’s “permissive” theory of precedent, elaborated in his recent
article Precedent as Permission, goes along the same way. Richard M. Re,
Precedent as Permission, 99 TEX. L. REV 907 (2021) [hereinafter Re, Precedent
as Permission]; see also Frederick Schauer, Stare Decisis—Rhetoric and Reality
in the Supreme Court, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 121, 143 (suggesting that stare decisis
does not generally pose serious constraints). Both Re and Schauer refer to the
horizontal dimension of precedent when they argue their points.
15. Santiago Legarre, Towards a New Justificatory Theory of Comparative 
Constitutional Law, 1 STRATHMORE L.J. 90, 91 (2015) (distinguishing between
“comparative constitutional law” and “comparative constitutionalism”).
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452021] OVERRULING LOUISIANA
The terminology “vertical stare decisis” and “horizontal stare decisis”
reflects part of the truth: stare decisis is one phenomenon with two
dimensions, both of them very important and significantly interconnected.
Moreover, the concept of stare decisis in the horizontal dimension is well
settled in past and present Supreme Court jargon—we enjoy good
company in our choice of words, as this Article will reveal.
Part I of this Article will introduce, dissect, and synthetize the ways in
which two 2020 U.S. Supreme Court cases, Ramos v. Louisiana and June 
Medical v. Russo, approach horizontal precedent and overruling. This
section will pay special attention to the way in which the so-called “Marks
doctrine” features in those cases. Part II will pinpoint the dimensions of
stare decisis, explore when stare decisis is strongest and weakest, and
specifically define precedent. Part III will dig further into the Marks
doctrine, introduce whether Ramos and June Medical are “Marks
precedents,” explore the idea of “unMarksable” cases—cases in which the
Marks doctrine cannot apply—and analyze the precedential value of
Apodaca v Oregon. Part IV will demonstrate how the discussed principles
of precedent affect Ramos and June Medical.
I. RAMOS AND JUNE MEDICAL: AN INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2020 term offered some of the Court’s most
robust discussions about stare decisis and precedent in modern times.
Ramos v. Louisiana16 and June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo,17 both
cases out of Louisiana, tasked the Court with some difficult questions
about the role of precedent, horizontal stare decisis, and overruling.
Furthermore, both cases feature fractured decisions and analysis of prior
fractured decisions, thus exposing fundamental questions about precedent
and the Marks doctrine.
A. Ramos v. Louisiana
In Ramos v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires unanimous jury verdicts for
criminal convictions and applies equally to state and federal criminal
16. Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020).
17. June Med. Services L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020).
360570-LSU_82-1_Text.indd  50 11/19/21  11:59 AM




     
    
 
  
    
   






     














   
   
 
    
     
 
   
    
      
  
    
   
      
 
     
     
46 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
trials.18 Ramos reversed the unanimous19 decision of the three-judge panel
of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal of Louisiana, which upheld article
1, section 17 of the Louisiana Constitution and Louisiana Code of
Criminal Procedure article 782.20 Both laws allowed criminal convictions 
when only 10 out of 12 jurors voted to convict, and courts in Louisiana
had repeatedly upheld both laws per the U.S. Supreme Court case Apodaca
v. Oregon.21 The Supreme Court overruled Louisiana, however, with a
fractured decision in Ramos.22 
Justice Gorsuch penned the opinion of the Court, joined to various
extents by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kavanaugh. Justice
Thomas concurred in the judgment. Justices Alito, Roberts, and Kagan
dissented. The split in the majority can be traced to disagreements over the
treatment of Apodaca v. Oregon as precedent.23 A dissection of the
decision yields four broad groups: (1) those who did not view Apodaca as 
precedent at all (Justices Gorsuch, Ginsburg, and Breyer); (2) those who
viewed Apodaca as precedent but wished to overrule it (Justices
Sotomayor and Kavanaugh); (3) one who wished to impose a new
constitutional framework on the issue (Justice Thomas); and (4) those who
viewed Apodaca as precedent and wished to stand by it because they
thought there were no grounds for overruling (Justice Alito, Chief Justice
Roberts, and Justice Kagan, the dissenters). No doubt with this split in
mind, Justice Kavanaugh in Ramos concluded, “As I read the Court’s
various opinions today, six Justices treat the result in Apodaca as a 
precedent for purposes of stare decisis analysis. A different group of six
Justices concluded that Apodaca should be and is overruled.”24 The first
group is comprised of Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, Thomas, Alito,
Kagan, and Chief Justice Roberts. The second group is comprised of
18. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1397 (“There can be no question either that the Sixth
Amendment’s unanimity requirement applies to state and federal criminal trials
equally.”).
19. With a three-judge panel composed of Chief Judge McKay, Judge
Lombard, and Judge Lobrano, Chief Judge McKay authored the opinion of the
court in which Judge Lobrano concurred in result but without reasons. State v.
Ramos, 231 So. 3d 44 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2017).
20. Id. at 54.
21. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (traditionally thought to uphold
state laws allowing non-unanimous jury convictions).
22. Justice Alito, dissenting, made reference to the “badly fractured majority”
and explained that in Ramos the majority was divided “into four separate camps.”
Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1432. See also infra text at note 24 (where Justice Kavanaugh
says something to a similar effect).
23. Apodaca, 406 U.S. 404.
24. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1416 n.6 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part).
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Justices Gorsuch, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Thomas.
With regard to Justices Gorsuch, Ginsburg, and Breyer, however, it seems
like a stretch to affirm that they concluded “that Apodaca should be and is 
overruled.” If Apodaca was not a precedent at all, it certainly did not need
overruling, or rather, it could not be the object of overruling.
To repeat, Justices Gorsuch, Ginsburg, and Breyer arrived at the
conclusion that Apodaca was not precedent, not even by way of the Marks
doctrine. The Marks doctrine is the limited instruction from the Supreme
Court in Marks v. United States, which states, “When a fragmented Court
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the
assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds . . . .’”25 Marks was relevant to the Ramos Court’s
analysis because the deciding vote in Apodaca to uphold non-unanimous
jury verdicts was Justice Powell with a detailed concurring opinion.26 
In Section IV.A. of Justice Gorsuch’s opinion, a section joined only
by Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, the plurality found that all parties to the
Ramos case “accept[ed] that Apodaca yielded no controlling opinion at
all.”27 In finding Marks inapplicable, Justice Gorsuch further wrote for the
plurality, “In particular, both sides admit that Justice Powell’s opinion
cannot bind us.”28 This reasoning stemmed from the belief that Justice 
Powell’s concurring opinion in Apodaca was incompatible with Marks— 
the concurring opinion was not the narrowest grounds.29 In Apodaca, 
Justice Powell agreed that the Sixth Amendment required unanimity, but
he endorsed a dual-track rule of incorporation that would not incorporate
the Sixth Amendment’s unanimous jury right against the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment.30 Justice Gorsuch observed that the Supreme
Court had already foreclosed on a dual-track Sixth Amendment jury theory
prior to Apodaca.31 
25. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
26. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 366 (1972). Apodaca v. Oregon and 
Johnson v. Louisiana both concerned the constitutionality of non-unanimous jury
verdicts and were decided on the same day. Justice Powell’s concurrence
attributed to Apodaca is found at the Johnson citation.
27. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1403 (plurality opinion).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Johnson, 406 U.S. at 375.
31. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1402 (plurality opinion) (“Justice Powell reached a
different result only by relying on a dual-track theory of incorporation that a
majority of the Court had already rejected (and continues to reject).”). The full
360570-LSU_82-1_Text.indd  52 11/19/21  11:59 AM










   
   
   
      
  






    
 
 






    
  
    
   
     
 
   
 
   
    
     
       
     
  
  
48 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
Accordingly, Justice Gorsuch and company found the logic of Justice 
Powell’s concurring opinion outside the rationale of the other justices in
the Apodaca majority and were unable to create a single rationale: “[T]o 
accept [Justice Powell’s] reasoning as precedential, we would have to
embrace a new and dubious proposition: that a single Justice writing only
for himself has the authority to bind this Court to propositions it has
already rejected.”32 Without a majority rationale, Justice Gorsuch’s three-
justice plurality rejected Apodaca as a precedent; furthermore, they also
rejected the result of Apodaca as precedent. Justice Gorsuch appears to
assert that the result of Apodaca is necessarily entangled in its reasoning:
In Apodaca, this means that when (1) a defendant is convicted in
state court, (2) at least 10 of the 12 jurors vote to convict, and
(3) the defendant argues that the conviction violates the
Constitution because the vote was not unanimous, the challenge
fails. Where does the convenient “state court” qualification come
from? Neither the Apodaca plurality nor the dissent included any
limitation like that—their opinions turned on the meaning of the
Sixth Amendment. What the dissent characterizes as Apodaca’s 
result turns out to be nothing more than Justice Powell’s reasoning
about dual-track incorporation dressed up to look like a logical
proof.33 
This conclusion begs the question of whether Apodaca is truly an
anomaly and whether a case can ever be completely non-precedential for
purposes of stare decisis.34 
In contrast to Justice Gorsuch’s plurality opinion, Justices Sotomayor
and Kavanaugh viewed Apodaca as precedent and explored horizontal
stare decisis from a policy perspective. Justice Sotomayor set forth three
policy arguments for overruling Apodaca. First, she agreed with the
majority that Apodaca’s reasoning was “on shaky ground from the start.”35 
She found that Apodaca’s problematic split rationale made the case
weaker precedent from a policy perspective even though it was still
precedent.36 Second, Justice Sotomayor reasoned that stare decisis is
incorporation of the right to trial by jury began in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 155 (1968).
32. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1402 (plurality opinion).
33. Id. at 1404.
34. This question is addressed in Section III.B of this Article.
35. Id. at 1409 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part).
36. Id. (“But put simply, this is not a case where we cast aside precedent
‘simply because a majority of this Court now disagrees with’ it.”) (quoting
Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 133 (2013)).
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492021] OVERRULING LOUISIANA
weakest, or “at its nadir,”37 when the Court considers issues of criminal
procedure “that implicate fundamental constitutional protections.”38 She
contrasted issues of criminal procedure with issues of private economic
rights, which she identified as the issues where stare decisis is strongest.
Finally, Justice Sotomayor reasoned that the racist history of Louisiana’s
non-unanimous jury law and the fact that the Louisiana legislature never
“truly grappled with the [law’s] sordid history in reenacting [it]” provided
further policy reasons to downplay any stare decisis effects of Apodaca.39 
Based on these reasons, Justice Sotomayor found Apodaca precedentially
weak and appropriate to overrule.
Like Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kavanaugh set forth his own policy
reasons to overrule Apodaca. Justice Kavanaugh first recognized that stare
decisis is not an “inexorable command,” and the Court may, under certain
circumstances, overrule erroneous precedent.40 Second, Justice
Kavanaugh, similar to Justice Sotomayor, reasoned that stare decisis is
more flexible in constitutional cases than in cases of statutory
interpretation.41 Justice Kavanaugh then identified the Court’s past factors
for deciding whether the Court should observe stare decisis.42 These
factors, according to the Justice, had been applied inconsistently in the
past; therefore, Justice Kavanaugh crafted a stare decisis analysis with
three considerations.43 
Justice Kavanaugh’s first consideration was whether a prior decision
is “grievously or egregiously wrong.”44 The Justice instructed that the
Court should examine “the precedent’s reasoning, consistency and
coherence with other decisions, changed law, changed facts, and
37. Id. (quoting Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 116 n.5).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1410.
40. Id. at 1412 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part).
41. Id. at 1413.
42. Id. at 1414.
The stare decisis factors identified by the Court in its past cases include:
• the quality of the precedent’s reasoning;
• the precedent’s consistency and coherence with previous or subsequent
decisions;
• changed law since the prior decision;
• changed facts since the prior decision;
• the workability of the precedent;
• the reliance interests of those who have relied on the precedent; and
• the age of the precedent.
43. Id. at 1414–15.
44. Id.
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50 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
workability.”45 Justice Kavanaugh’s second consideration was whether
“the prior decision caused significant negative jurisprudential or real
world consequences.”46 The third consideration was whether “overruling
the prior decision unduly upset reliance interests.”47 
In applying this framework, Justice Kavanaugh first found that
Apodaca was egregiously wrong because it was an outlier case, even at the 
time it was decided, and was contrary to long-standing precedent that the
Sixth Amendment required unanimous juries. Second, the Justice found
that Apodaca caused negative consequences because it created inequity in
criminal convictions across the nation, and it created avenues for strongly
racist policies.48 Third, Justice Kavanaugh found that overruling Apodaca
would not upset reliance interests because only Louisiana and Oregon
allowed non-unanimous juries under Apodaca.49 The Justice also posited 
that the change would be prospective only and that Louisiana had already
changed its law to provide for unanimous juries.50 
Finally, Justice Thomas’s concurrence reevaluated stare decisis as a
controlling doctrine, at least at the horizontal level. Justice Thomas wrote,
The question then becomes whether these decisions are entitled to
stare decisis effect. As I have previously explained, “the Court’s
typical formulation of the stare decisis standard does not comport
with our judicial duty under Article III because it elevates
demonstrably erroneous decisions—meaning decisions outside
the realm of permissible interpretation—over the text of the
Constitution and other duly enacted federal law.”51 
After finding that the Court should only consider whether the Court’s
precedents are within the realm of permissible interpretation, Justice
45. Id. at 1415.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1417–18.
49. Id. at 1419.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1421 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting Gamble v.
United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1981 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring)). It would
seem that the newly appointed Justice Amy Coney Barrett would agree with this
position. See Amy Coney Barrett, Precedent and Jurisprudential Disagreement, 
91 TEX. L. REV. 1711, 1728 (2013) (“I tend to agree with those who say that a
justice’s duty is to the Constitution and that it is thus more legitimate for her to
enforce her best understanding of the Constitution rather than a precedent she
thinks clearly in conflict with it.”).
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512021] OVERRULING LOUISIANA
Thomas set forth his own analysis.52 Taking a historical approach, Justice
Thomas found that the practice of unanimous jury verdicts was common
and a permissible gloss on the Sixth Amendment.53 He then, perhaps
unsurprisingly,54 reasoned that the Sixth Amendment should be
incorporated against the states through the Privileges and Immunities
Clause rather than the Due Process Clause.55 
B. June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo
In June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo, the Supreme Court struck
down a Louisiana law requiring hospital admitting privileges for abortion
providers as unconstitutional.56 The decision affirmed the original ruling
of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana.57 
The Supreme Court’s ruling also followed a stay that it had issued on the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals’ stay of the Middle District’s ruling.58 June 
Medical involved, in large part, an examination of Whole Woman’s Health
v. Hellerstedt (WWH), a case involving a nearly identical Texas law that
the Supreme Court had struck down just four years prior to the June
Medical decision.59 It is crucial to note that Chief Justice Roberts had
dissented in WWH.
In contrast to Ramos, the June Medical majority judgment was split 
into a much more straightforward 4–1. On the merits, the four member
plurality, led by Justice Breyer, primarily analyzed whether the district
court applied the proper standards from Planned Parenthood v. Casey60 
and WWH in determining whether the Louisiana abortion law was
52. Justice Thomas has made clear that he rejects the factor tests that the 
Court has laid out for stare decisis analyses. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1981–88 
(Thomas, J., concurring).
53. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1422–23 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
54. A staple of Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence is a rejection of incorporation
under the Due Process Clause in favor of incorporation under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause. See, e.g., McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Timbs v. Indiana,
139 S. Ct. 682, 692 (2019).
55. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1423–25 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
56. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2132 (2020).
57. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d 27, 90 (M.D. La.
2017).
58. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee, 139 S. Ct. 663 (2019).
59. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
60. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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52 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
unconstitutional.61 After reviewing the record, the plurality found that the
district court had properly applied the correct legal standards—primarily 
the undue-burden test and substantial-obstacle test.62 The plurality then 
went on to find that the district court’s fact-finding was not “clearly
erroneous” under the appellate standard of review for questions of fact.63 
The deciding fifth vote in June Medical came from Chief Justice
Roberts.64 The Chief Justice’s opinion concurring in the judgment reveals
that stare decisis was his primary reason for voting to strike down the
law:65 stare decisis, with regard to WWH insofar as it endorsed Casey, the
overruling of which had not been requested by the relevant parties.66 In
addition, he wished to clarify the Casey standards to avoid what he
considered to have been their misinterpretation in WWH. Citing Ramos, 
the Chief Justice reiterated that stare decisis is not an “inexorable
command.”67 Nevertheless, he found, “The doctrine also brings pragmatic
benefits. Respect for precedent ‘promotes the evenhanded, predictable,
and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial
decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the
judicial process.’”68 
Relying on Casey as precedent, Chief Justice Roberts sought to clarify
the perceived introduction of a burdens-and-benefits balancing test set
forth by the majority in WWH and restated by the plurality in June 
Medical.69 The Chief Justice first stated that Casey’s undue-burden test
was the controlling test in WWH.70 He then observed that WWH’s directive
that “courts consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access
together with the benefits those laws confer” must be read in conjunction
with Casey.71 Chief Justice Roberts finally explained that, contrary to the
61. June Med., 140 S. Ct. at 2120 (plurality opinion) (“Turning to the merits,
we apply the constitutional standards set forth in our earlier abortion-related cases, 
and in particular in Casey and Whole Woman’s Health.”).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2121.
64. Id. at 2133 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in judgment).
65. Id. at 2134 (“The legal doctrine of stare decisis requires us, absent special 
circumstances, to treat like cases alike. The Louisiana law imposes a burden on
access to abortion just as severe as that imposed by the Texas law, for the same
reasons. Therefore, Louisiana’s law cannot stand under our precedents.”).
66. Id. at 2135 (“Neither party has asked us to reassess the constitutional 
validity of [Casey’s] standard.”).
67. Id. at 2134 (quoting Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1405 (2020)).
68. Id. (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)).
69. Id. at 2135–38.
70. Id. at 2135.
71. Id.
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532021] OVERRULING LOUISIANA
dissent’s suggestion in June Medical, there is no balancing test alone;
rather, the undue-burden inquiry requires a finding that a restriction
imposes a substantial obstacle to abortion.72 Benefits, on the other hand,
can be relevant “in considering the threshold requirement that the State
have a ‘legitimate purpose’ and that the law be ‘reasonably related to that
goal.’”73 Ultimately, the Chief Justice found that this was, at least in part,
the analysis used in WWH and also the analysis used by the district court
in June Medical.74 Considering that Casey was unquestioned and
unquestionably governing the situation, under principles of stare decisis,
Chief Justice Roberts found that similar results to WWH should follow for
June Medical.
II. RAMOS AND JUNE MEDICAL: THE FURTHER QUESTIONS
In order to understand the significance of precedent in Ramos and June 
Medical, a more in-depth discussion of the horizontal and vertical
dimensions of stare decisis is helpful. Furthermore, one must
fundamentally understand what constitutes precedent. Finally, to explore
the significance of Ramos and June Medical, it is necessary to look at
precedent in light of the Marks doctrine, which is instructive regarding the
nature of precedent in fractured decisions.
A. Rise of Horizontal Stare Decisis
The favored terminology in this Article, “horizontal and vertical
dimensions of stare decisis,” was very recently endorsed by one Supreme
Court Justice in Ramos v. Louisiana. Justice Kavanaugh, concurring in
part, wrote that “the stare decisis issue in this case is one of horizontal
stare decisis—that is, the respect that this Court owes to its own precedents
and the circumstances under which this Court may appropriately overrule
a precedent. By contrast, vertical stare decisis is absolute, as it must be in
a hierarchical system with ‘one supreme Court.’”75 
Justice Kavanaugh’s opinion with its accompanying footnote in
Ramos is helpful, as it constitutes a small treatise on stare decisis, rather
unusual in a Supreme Court case but highly useful for the learner.
Although, like Justice Kavanaugh, we favor using “stare decisis” and
“precedent” flexibly, we also think it is as crucial to distinguish which
72. Id. at 2138.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2141–42.
75. Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1416 n.5 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring in part).
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54 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
dimension of stare decisis and precedent one is talking about. Otherwise, 
the flexibility will inevitably introduce confusion and other negative side 
effects.
To dig deeper into the meaning of “horizontal stare decisis”76 one 
needs to examine the famous 1932 decision in Burnet v. Coronado Oil &
Gas Co. and Justice Brandeis’s dissent.77 This dissent has garnered much
authority since its publication,78 and it is instructive to explain the true
nature of horizontal stare decisis and when prior cases may be overruled.
In Burnet, Justice Brandeis suggested both why it makes sense to include
the horizontal facet within the doctrine of precedent and how that facet
differs from the vertical dimension of precedent. 
The prevailing reading of Justice Brandeis’s Burnet dissent is that his
commentary is not about horizontal stare decisis in general but about
horizontal stare decisis dealing with constitutional matters79—a reading 
unfortunately endorsed by Justice Kavanaugh in Ramos.80 According to
this reading, when the consideration of precedents dealing with
constitutional matters is at stake, the doctrine of stare decisis is more
flexible.81 This interpretation is supported by the passage: “[I]n cases
involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative
action is practically impossible, this court has often overruled its earlier
decisions.”82 There is no doubt that this passage refers to horizontal stare
decisis. When it comes to vertical stare decisis, the subject matter at stake
76. The term “horizontal stare decisis” has been used by others. See, e.g.,
Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011,
1015 (2003). Justice Kavanaugh also used the term in his Ramos opinion,
illustrating that the High Court is aware of the distinctions between the
dimensions of stare decisis. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1416 n.5.
77. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
78. Significantly, in one of our two cases, Justice Kavanaugh made reference
to Justice Brandeis’s “canonical opinion in Burnet.” Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1413
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part).
79. See D. H. Chamberlain, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis as Applied to
Decisions of Constitutional Questions, 3 HARV. L. REV. 125, 128–31 (1889).
80. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1413 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part) (quoting
Burnet, 285 U.S. at 406 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
81. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172–73 
(1989); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997).
82. Burnet, 285 U.S. at 406–07 (emphasis added). While not alluding exactly
to constitutional questions, but to “cases concerning [criminal] procedur[e] rules
that implicate fundamental constitutional protections,” Justice Sotomayor put it 
nicely in Ramos, “the force of stare decisis is at its nadir.” Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 
1409 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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552021] OVERRULING LOUISIANA
is quite irrelevant. Given the hierarchical system of courts, lower courts
will in principle always abide by the holdings of higher courts’ rulings.
These rulings are hard law for a lower court.
The preceding, prevailing reading of Justice Brandeis’s dissent is
unobjectionable but incomplete. Justice Brandeis’s construction regarding
constitutional questions in Burnet also applies to any precedent at the
horizontal level, regardless of its subject matter. Even though the Justice
always referred to “stare decisis” in general, the context reveals that
Justice Brandeis had only horizontal precedent in mind.
Before Justice Brandeis stated his famous line on “cases involving the
Federal Constitution,” he first affirmed that “[s]tare decisis is not . . . [a]
universal inexorable command.”83 Despite this line, vertical stare decisis
actually is an inexorable command. In Ramos, Justice Kavanaugh
described vertical stare decisis as “absolute.”84 Calling vertical precedent
“hard” law helps represent this salient feature of the vertical dimension of
stare decisis. 
Next Justice Brandeis opined that “[t]he rule of stare decisis, though
one tending to consistency and uniformity of decision, is not inflexible.
Whether it shall be followed or departed from is a question entirely within
the discretion of the court, which is again called upon to consider a
question once decided.”85 Here, too, it is evident that vertical stare decisis
is out of the question. “The discretion of the court” clearly refers to the
Supreme Court when it decides, horizontally, whether its own precedent
“shall be followed or departed from” by the Court itself.86 
Finally, the Justice wrote that “[s]tare decisis is usually the wise
policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable
rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”87 Justice Brandeis offers
the Court discretion to make a policy decision for those situations in which
it is called to consider whether to apply “stare decisis” or, instead, to
overrule prior jurisprudence. Policy decisions are clearly absent from the
domain of vertical stare decisis, as lower courts may not indulge in the
same policy considerations when they consider the precedent of higher
courts. 
83. Burnet, 285 U.S. at 405.
84. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1416 n.5 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part) (“By
contrast, vertical stare decisis is absolute, as it must be in a hierarchical system
with ‘one supreme Court.’”).
85. Burnet, 285 U.S. at 405–06 (quoting Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205,
212 (1910)).
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 406.
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56 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
It is clear from Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Burnet that the three very
significant references to “stare decisis” are references to horizontal stare
decisis. Thus, horizontal stare decisis is (1) the “wise policy,” but only
usually; and (2) a “command,” but not an inexorable command. By way 
of contrast, vertical stare decisis is always the wise policy, and it is an 
inexorable command. In fact, the cases citing these three quoted portions
from Justice Brandeis’s dissent ad infinitum were cases dealing with
horizontal stare decisis, not vertical.88 
The rudimentary general theory contained in the opening section of
Justice Brandeis’s dissent applies to horizontal stare decisis in general,
regardless of the subject matter involved, because the carving out of
constitutional questions comes in after his three considerations on
precedent. This is compatible with the recognition that the relaxation of
precedent, always present in the horizontal dimension as opposed to the
inexorable vertical dimension, is even more present when constitutional
matters are involved. 
In conclusion: (1) horizontal stare decisis is always softer than vertical
stare decisis and (2) when constitutional questions are at stake, horizontal
stare decisis is even softer. A logical consequence of this conclusion is that
when it comes to constitutional questions, overruling happens “often,” but
when it comes to other questions, overruling happens “occasionally.” In 
Justice Brandeis’s own words, “in cases involving the Federal
Constitution . . . this court has often overruled its earlier decisions;”89 but
“[t]his Court has, in [other] matters deemed important, occasionally
88. For references to Justice Brandeis’s dicta in majority opinions of the
Supreme Court that deal with horizontal stare decisis, see, for example, Smith v.
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665–66 (1944); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530,
543 (1962); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974); Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois,
431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 695
(1978); Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 273 n.18 (1980); Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827–28 (1991); Hubbard v. United States, 513 U.S. 695,
712 n.11 (1995); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 571 U.S. 44, 63 (1996);
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235–36 (1997); Kimble v. Marvel Ent., LLC,
576 U.S. 446, 455 (2015); Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., 
Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
89. Burnet, 128 U.S. at 406–07 (emphasis added). While not alluding exactly
to constitutional questions, but to “cases concerning [criminal] procedur[e] rules
that implicate fundamental constitutional protections,” Justice Sotomayor put it 
nicely in Ramos, “the force of stare decisis is at its nadir.” Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 
1409 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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overruled its earlier decisions although correction might have been secured
by legislation.”90 
By way of further reference to the shades of normativity identified in
the Introduction of this Article, the general rule summarized in the
preceding paragraph can be sketched out by establishing four levels or
degrees of normativity. From three to zero: (3) vertical stare decisis—hard 
binding force: overruling is out of the question; (2) horizontal stare 
decisis—soft binding force: overruling may happen occasionally;
(1) horizontal stare decisis in constitutional matters—softer binding force:
overruling may happen often; and (0) the pure civil law system concept of
“precedent”: near zero binding force but merely persuasive authority.91 
Although the above is a fair description of the status quo today and in
1932 when Burnet was decided, this is not to say that things are or were 
crystal clear. The difference between (2) “soft” and (1) “softer” is
sometimes blurry, and it is not possible to describe precisely the reality in
general terms to accurately predict overruling. Even the clear-cut
distinction between maximum, hard binding force at the vertical level and
the soft binding force of horizontal stare decisis in general is sometimes
blurry in reality. In order to uphold vertical stare decisis, the Court may
sometimes treat horizontal stare decisis as if it were an “inexorable
command.” In June Medical, for example, when Chief Justice Roberts
decided to honor the precedential value of the judgment in WWH, he was 
not only respecting a recent prior decision in which he had dissented but
also reasserting the strength of WWH at the vertical level.92 In line with the
stay to which the Chief Justice had concurred,93 the decision to treat WWH
as precedent was also a message for lower courts that might have been
perceived as subtly challenging the authority of WWH—in the vertical
dimension, where that should never happen—and therefore challenging
90. Burnet, 128 U.S. at 406 n.1. The text to this note makes it clear that the 
reference is to matters other than constitutional. These other matters are those in
which “correction can be had by legislation.” Id. at 406. Justice Brandeis then
immediately contrasted those matters with constitutional ones “where correction
through legislative action is practically impossible.” Id. at 407.
91. On shades of normativity analysis, see Legarre and Handy, supra note 6;
Santiago Legarre, From Comparative Constitutional Law to Comparative
Constitutionalism, 12 FAULKNER L. REV. (forthcoming 2021).
92. See supra Introduction (citing Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1416 n.5 (Kavanaugh,
J., concurring in part)).
93. See supra Section I.B note 57–58 (referring to a stay that the Supreme
Court had issued on the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals’ stay of the Middle 
District’s ruling. The Chief Justice had concurred despite having dissented in the
prior case).
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58 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
the authority of the Supreme Court itself. Once WWH was decided the way
it was decided, the Chief Justice very likely concluded that the fact that he
had dissented in WWH was less important than the opportunity found in
June Medical to defend the Court’s authority. 
To be clear, the above by no means suggests that the avenue chosen
by the Chief Justice in June Medical was the only way to respect the
Court’s authority or that the dissenters in June Medical disrespected the
Court’s authority. Unlike the Fifth Circuit, for whom abiding by WWH
was an inexorable command,94 the possibility of overruling was in the
menu of options for the Supreme Court. In particular, Chief Justice
Roberts, who “continue[d] to believe that [WWH] was wrongly decided,”95 
had the option to join Justices Alito and company and transform their view
into a majority opinion. Instead, the Chief Justice opted to forego that
possibility and to respect WWH’s result. Nevertheless, if he would have
voted for WWH’s overruling, no one could have legitimately suggested
that in overruling itself the Court had compromised its own authority.96 As
Justice Kavanaugh reminded us in his little treatise on stare decisis in
Ramos, overruling is common in the Supreme Court; in the words of
Justice Brandeis, it happens “often” in constitutional cases, and June 
Medical was certainly a constitutional case.
B. Horizontal Stare Decisis in Ramos and June Medical
The way we read Burnet—by circumscribing the references to stare
decisis to its horizontal dimension and partially disentangling such
references from the subject matter at stake—should illuminate the
interpretations of the relevant passages in both Ramos and June Medical.
The majority in Ramos, for example, essentially reiterated Justice
Brandeis’s idea, writing first that “stare decisis isn’t supposed to be the art
of methodically ignoring what everyone knows to be true”97 and later that
“stare decisis has never been interpreted to be an inexorable command.”98 
In the light of our suggested interpretation of Burnet, the Ramos majority’s
words apply only to horizontal stare decisis. Furthermore, given the
94. Regardless of the hypothesis in the text—where a lower court might show
lack of respect for Supreme Court precedent by means of attempting to overrule
it from below—it should be noted that this is not what the Fifth Circuit saw itself
doing in June. See June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee, 905 F.3d 787, 791 (5th Cir.
2018), rev’d sub nom., June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020).
95. June Med., 140 S. Ct. at 2133 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
96. See infra Part IV.
97. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1405.
98. Id.
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rhetoric of these segments of the Ramos majority opinion and their
resemblance to the relevant ones in Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Burnet, it 
seems fair to predicate these Ramos dicta to horizontal stare decisis in
general, not just to cases where constitutional matters are involved.
The logical consequence of the Ramos majority’s view endorsing
Burnet begs the question: when should the Court overrule itself? Because
there is no inexorable command at the horizontal level of stare decisis,
overruling may happen “occasionally,” such as when statutory
interpretation is involved, or “often,” such as in constitutional matters.99 
How infrequent is “occasionally” and how frequent is “often”? These are 
normative questions without a predetermined answer. The justices in
Ramos reiterated previous Supreme Court dicta regarding when it is
legitimate to overrule,100 but one cannot draw from those considerations
any general, useful, valid rule; therefore, we repeat, it is hard to predict
when overruling will happen.101 Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the 
jurisprudential, interpretative theory embraced by each justice will make
overruling essentially available as a legitimate option, depending on the
theory in question. For example, Justice Thomas’s clear view, shared less
clearly by some of his colleagues at the Court,102 that the Constitution is
one thing and its interpretation by the Court is a different one103 leaves 
ample room for the identification of “erroneous”104 precedents. This view
of overruling, insofar as it holds that the Court should only consider
whether the Court’s precedents are within the realm of permissible
99. See supra Section II.A.
100. See supra Section I.A.
101. See supra Section II.A.
102. Justice Kavanaugh, for example, distinguishes the question “whether the
Constitution prohibits non-unanimous juries” from the question “whether to
overrule an erroneous constitutional precedent that allowed non-unanimous
juries.” Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1414 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part).
103. The rejection, that is, of the “realist” dictum that “the constitution is what 
the judges say it is.” M. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 204 (1963) (“We are
under a Constitution but the Constitution is what the judges say it is, and the 
judiciary is the safeguard of our liberty and of our property under the
Constitution.”).
104. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1421 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
Professor Re interpreted Justice Thomas in Ramos along lines perhaps similar to 
ours: “For Justice Thomas, this conclusion springs primarily from an originalist 
inquiry into history and theoretical points about legal interpretation.” Re,
Precedent as Permission, supra note 14, at 3; see also Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1414
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (suggesting that a precedent be egregiously wrong
before overruling it).
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60 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
interpretation,105 prevents the enshrinement of “demonstrably erroneous
decisions . . . over the text of the Constitution.”106 In contrast, if “the 
Constitution is what the judges say it is,”107 then overruling is still possible;
however, it is more likely that the entrenchment of precedents will be such
that the odds of overruling will become significantly lower, other factors
being equal.
Similarly, when in June Medical Chief Justice Roberts wrote that
“[t]he legal doctrine of stare decisis requires us, absent special
circumstances, to treat like cases alike,”108 he surely meant, “treat present
Supreme Court cases like you treated similar past Supreme Court cases.” 
No vertical consideration is to be found there. The same is true when,
quoting the Black’s Law Dictionary, he added, “Stare decisis (‘to stand by
things decided’) is the legal term for fidelity to precedent.”109 He must
here mean “fidelity to horizontal precedent.” For from the context, we
know by now that what he has in mind in those two references is whether
or not to overrule WWH.110 What is at stake therefore is the horizontal
dimension of precedent. Still, the Chief Justice alluded to “stare decisis,”
and rightly so, insofar as one keeps in mind which facet of stare decisis he
meant.
Black’s Law Dictionary (in the very same page cited to by the Chief
Justice) offers a definition of horizontal stare decisis: “The doctrine that a
court, esp. an appellate court, must adhere to its own prior decisions,
unless it finds compelling reasons to overrule itself.”111 It also offers a
definition of vertical stare decisis: “The doctrine that a court must strictly
follow the decisions handed down by higher courts within the same
jurisdiction.”112 According to the Dictionary, these terms were used for
the first time in 1977,113 which provides us with an authoritative
confirmation of the idea that the term “horizontal stare decisis,” favored
in this Article, has been in use for a while.
105. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1421 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting
Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1981 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring)). 
106. Id.; see also Nina Varsava, Precedent on Precedent, 169 PENN L. REV.
118, 131 (2020) (noting that “Justice Thomas has no patience for wrongly decided
cases”).
107. See PUSEY, supra note 103, at 204.
108. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2134 (2020) (Roberts,
C.J., concurring).
109. Id. (citing Stare Decisis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019)).
110. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2319 (2016).
111. Stare Decisis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
112. Id.
113. Id.
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612021] OVERRULING LOUISIANA
C. Precedents as to the Reasoning and Precedents as to the Result: The 
Special Case of Marks Precedents
What constitutes precedent? This is a question that has disturbed
theorists of the common law forever.114 Whatever the answer to this
question, what indeed constitutes precedent will apply by and large both
to the vertical and the horizontal dimensions of precedent.
Most binding past decisions are issued by collegiate tribunals.
Therefore, the question has much to do with the problem of majorities in
courts. In the decision of a collegiate court, one ought to distinguish the
reasoning, or rationale, from the conclusion, or result. In the American
system, the former is contained in an opinion; the latter is contained in a
judgment. The Supreme Court may, for example, conclude to confirm the
lower court’s decision. It may be that there is only one majority reasoning
leading to that conclusion: this is known as a “majority opinion,” where
five or more Justices sign the same document containing one, single
reasoning. The precedential value of majority opinions is obvious. But it
may be, in another hypothetical, that some Supreme Court justices offer
reason A to confirm the lower court’s decision while others offer reason B
to the same end. Each of the opinions containing A and B are called
concurring opinions in the American system, and the one among those
concurring opinions that carries the most votes is called a plurality
opinion.115 Regardless of whether the Court’s opinion is a majority opinion
or merely a plurality opinion accompanied by other concurrences, there
will always be a majority judgment of the Court that declares the result of
the case. Furthermore, as Justice Kavanaugh neatly wrote, “In the
American system of stare decisis, the result and the reasoning each
independently have precedential force, and courts are therefore bound to
follow both the result and the reasoning of a prior decision.”116 There may 
114. It is noteworthy that in Ramos the Supreme Court majority cited the most
authoritative, classic book on precedent. Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390,
1405 (2020) (citing R. CROSS & J. HARRIS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW 1 (4th
ed. 1991)). The dissent in Ramos also cites other doctrinal works on precedent.
Id. at 1429 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing J. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 191 (10th
ed. 1947); M. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 3 (2008); Landes & Posner,
Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J. LAW & ECON. 249,
250 (1976)).
115. As Nina Varsava puts it, “[A] plurality opinion is the concurring
opinion . . . that received the most votes of all the concurrences.” Varsava, supra
note 106, at 119 n.4.
116. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1416 n.6 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part). It 
might seem that the way the plurality in Ramos treated Apodaca would entail 
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62 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
also be dissents, but these are largely irrelevant for precedential
purposes.117 In sum, a majority opinion yields a precedent as to the 
reasoning, leading to “reasoned stare decisis,” and a majority judgment
yields a precedent as to the result, leading to “results stare decisis.”
Despite this basic framework of precedent, there are actually three
meanings of precedent in the United States federal system: (1) precedent
as to the reasoning; (2) precedent as to the result; and sometimes
(3) precedent as to the result accompanied by a reasoning consisting in the 
narrowest grounds between two or more competing rationales that concur
in the result. The latter is known as Marks precedent.118 Marks precedents
constitute a legal fiction: what is indeed not a majority opinion, but rather 
one particular plurality opinion, is taken to be a majority opinion for stare
decisis purposes.
III. MARKS PRECEDENTS IN LIGHT OF RAMOS AND JUNE MEDICAL
Whenever a court faces a past decision in which there is a judgment
without one majority opinion but instead two or more opinions concurring
in the judgment, a question presents itself: is this past decision a Marks
precedent?119 This implies that Marks precedents are a species of a more
general type of decision in which the majority is split. Therefore, while 
every Marks precedent is a decision in which the majority is split, the
reverse is not true: not every decision where the majority is split counts as
a Marks precedent. In other words, not every case without a majority
denying the binding force of a precedent as to the result. But the way Justice 
Gorsuch does it allows for consideration of Apodaca as a one-off exception that 
does not comport with objecting to the general theory that there is stare decisis as
to the result. Justice Gorsuch appears to assert that the result of Apodaca is 
necessarily entangled in its reasoning, discussed infra Section III.B.
117. Williams put it thus: “Because dissents, by definition, are not necessary
to the judgment in the precedent case, they stand in a position similar to dicta and
are thus, arguably, not entitled to precedential effect.” Ryan C. Williams,
Questioning Marks: Plurality Decisions and Precedential Constraints, 69 STAN.
L. REV. 795, 819 (2017).
118. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
119. It has been argued, however, that the Marks inquiry is not quite the same
at the vertical and horizontal level, because at the latter “the Court has sometimes
concluded that the analysis is sufficiently complicated to render Marks unhelpful
as an analytic tool” and thus the Court “narrow[s]” its own prior precedents
without overtly overruling them. Williams, supra note 117, at 821 n.20; see
generally Richard M. Re, Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 1861, 1865 (2014) [hereinafter Re, Narrowing Precedent in the
Supreme Court]. 
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opinion is a Marks precedent, but for there to be a Marks precedent there
ought not be a majority opinion. For this reason, Ramos v. Louisiana is not
a Marks precedent and is not even susceptible of a Marks test. Slim as it
is, there is a majority opinion in Ramos consisting in those few segments
of Justice Gorsuch’s opinion—Parts I, II.A, III, and IV.B.1—that were
joined not only by the stalwart Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, who
endorsed Justice Gorsuch’s opinion in full, but also by Justices Sotomayor
and Kavanaugh, concurring in part. This majority opinion rejects Apodaca
generally and requires unanimous juries in state court criminal
proceedings.
Put simply, a decision in which the majority is split will count as a
Marks precedent if and only if it is possible to compare the votes that
concur in the majority judgment and conclude that one of them reaches
that judgment on narrower grounds than the other one(s). For this reason,
in “a Marks dispute . . . the litigants duel over which opinion represents
the narrowest and controlling one.”120 As Justice Alito stated in his dissent
in Ramos, the Marks rule “ascribes precedential status to decisions made
without majority agreement on the underlying rationale.”121 Or in the
words of Justice Kavanaugh in the same case, “When the Court’s decision
is splintered, courts follow the result, and they also follow the reasoning
or standards set forth in the opinion constituting the ‘narrowest grounds’
of the Justices in the majority.”122 
The preceding propositions implicitly follow from the Supreme
Court’s holding in the 1977 case that gave birth to the Marks doctrine:
“When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the
Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.’”123 Justice 
Kavanaugh held in 2013 when he was on the Court of Appeals, and
reiterated in 2020 in his separate vote in Ramos, that “the Marks rule is
ordinarily commonsensical to apply.”124 This may be true in some cases,
such as June Medical, where it is relatively easy to discern that the grounds
120. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1403 (plurality opinion).
121. Id. at 1430 (Alito, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 1416 n.6 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part).
123. Marks, 430 U.S. at 193 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
124. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1416 n.6 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part); see
United States v. Duvall, 740 F.3d 604, 610–11 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring in denial of rehearing en banc). According to Justice Kavanaugh, the
Marks rule “usually means that courts in essence heed the opinion that occupies
the middle-ground position between (i) the broadest opinion among the Justices 
in the majority and (ii) the dissenting opinion.” Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1416–17 n.6.
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64 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
used by the four-member plurality to strike down the Louisiana law would
generally strike down more laws than the grounds used by the Chief
Justice, which are, in this sense, closer to the dissent than the four-member
plurality’s grounds. 
Although Justice Kavanaugh recognized that in most cases “it is
ordinarily commonsensical to apply,”125 the Marks doctrine does suffer
from severe complications in some cases that fall outside the scope of this
Article.126 Justice Alito, dissenting in Ramos, called the Marks doctrine 
“controversial” and indicated that the Supreme Court had recently
considered a case that implicated its meaning but ultimately decided the 
case on another ground.127 
With respect to precedent, what is the outcome after one 
unsuccessfully conducts a Marks analysis? There is still the judgment in
that case in which one failed to reconstruct the narrowest grounds. That
judgment itself carries some precedential force. Justice Kavanaugh put it
neatly in his concurrence in Ramos:
On [the] very rare occasions [in which] . . . it can be difficult to
discern which opinion’s reasoning has precedential effect under
Marks . . . the result of the decision still constitutes a binding
precedent for the federal and state courts, and for this Court.128 
Whether these occasions are “very rare” is debatable and a topic for
another day. In any event, Justice Kavanaugh is describing “result stare
decisis.”129 
When a certain precedent is both lacking a majority opinion and
insusceptible of a successful analysis under Marks, a lower court will
occasionally take advantage of those circumstances to ignore even the
125. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1416 n.6 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part).
126. See Williams, supra note 117, at 804 (discussing the shortcomings of the
Marks “narrowest grounds” rule); Richard M. Re, Beyond the Marks Rule, 132
HARV. L. REV. 1942, 1966–76 (2019) [hereinafter Re, Beyond the Marks Rule]
(discussing the normative shortcomings of Marks before suggesting the Marks 
rule may be better abandoned).
127. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1430 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Hughes v. United
States, 138 S. Ct. 1765 (2018)). 
128. Id. at 1416 n.6 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part) (internal citations
omitted).
129. See James Hardisty, Reflections on Stare Decisis, 55 IND. L.J. 41, 52–57 
(1979) (discussing the relationship between “rule” stare decisis and “result” stare 
decisis).
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652021] OVERRULING LOUISIANA
judgment in that precedent.130 But when this happens, the anomaly may 
offer another opportunity for interaction between the two dimensions of
stare decisis, with the Supreme Court revisiting the same question in a new
case in order to horizontally reaffirm the thin precedent and provide what
was originally lacking—a majority opinion or at least a Marks precedent.
An example of this interaction between the vertical and the horizontal
dimensions of stare decisis is the situation with the 1991 case Barnes v. 
Glen Theatre, Inc. 
A. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. and the Situation of UnMarksable Cases:
Perception, Reality, and Practicality
In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., the Supreme Court upheld Indiana’s
statutory restrictions on nude dancing.131 The decision, however, was a 
fractured 3–1–1–4.132 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the three-justice
plurality opinion joined by Justices O’Connor and Kennedy.133 The
plurality found that nude dancing was “expressive conduct protected by
the First Amendment.”134 The Chief Justice then decided that United
States v. O’Brien applied to the dancing, thus requiring the government’s
regulation to be (1) within the constitutional police power of government;
(2) in furtherance of a substantial government interest; (3) upon an interest
unrelated to the suppression of speech; and (4) no greater than necessary
to further the interest.135 When applying the test, Chief Justice Rehnquist
concluded that the regulation against nude dancing was within the
constitutional police power of government to regulate morality—which he
found to be a substantial government interest.136 He also concluded that
the interest was unrelated to the suppression of speech since the dancing
was still permissible with scant clothing. Finally, the Chief Justice
concluded that the regulation was narrowly tailored because the nudity ban
was the permissible end goal of the statute, and the dancers could still
dance.
Justice Souter in concurrence agreed with the plurality that nude
dancing was expressive and protected by the First Amendment.137 He also 
130. See Pap’s A.M. v. City of Erie, 719 A.2d 273, 278 (Pa. 1998), rev’d, 529 
U.S. 277 (2000).
131. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 567 (1991).
132. Id. at 562.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 565.
135. Id. at 567 (citing O’Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968)).
136. Id. at 569.
137. Id. at 582.
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66 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
agreed that the O’Brien test was the appropriate test for the statute.138 
Justice Souter, however, was more concerned with the secondary effects 
of nude dancing than the majority’s rationale of regulating morality.139 
Justice Souter applied the O’Brien test to the state’s interest in
discouraging prostitution, sexual assaults, and other criminal activity,
which he believed were negative secondary effects of nude dancing.140 The 
Justice concluded that this interest was permissible, substantial, and
narrowly tailored, thus satisfying the O’Brien test.141 
Although Justice Souter’s concurrence largely tracks the three-justice 
plurality opinion, Justice Scalia’s concurrence takes a much different
approach. Justice Scalia found that the statute was not directed at
expression at all and not subject to heightened First Amendment
scrutiny.142 Instead, the Justice surveyed the history of laws regulating
immoral conduct and, after finding that nude dancing fit the mold of non-
expression, concluded that the law should be analyzed under the rational-
basis test.143 Justice Scalia then concluded that moral opposition to nude
dancing satisfied the rational-basis test.144 Meanwhile, Justice White’s 
dissenting opinion concluded that the statute targeted specific expressive
conduct “because of its communicative attributes” rather than general
conduct and should therefore be struck down.145 
When a nearly identical nude dancing law reached the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court seven years after Barnes, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in Pap’s A.M. v. City of Erie perceived Barnes as unMarksable.146 The
court stated, “[W]e can find no point on which a majority of the Barnes
Court agreed. Thus, although we may find that the opinions expressed by
the Justices prove instructive, no clear precedent arises out of Barnes on
the issue of whether the Ordinance in the matter sub judice passes muster
under the First Amendment.”147 The Pennsylvania court then engaged in
138. Id.
139. Id. For an in-depth discussion about whether there is true distinction
between the public morality analysis and secondary effects analysis, see Santiago
Legarre & Gregory J. Mitchell, Secondary Effects and Public Morality, 40 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 321 (2017).
140. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 582.
141. Id. at 587.
142. Id. at 572.
143. Id. at 580.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 595–96.
146. Pap’s A.M. v. City of Erie, 719 A.2d 273, 278 (Pa. 1998), rev’d, 529 U.S.
277 (2000).
147. Id.
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672021] OVERRULING LOUISIANA
an independent analysis of the law, selecting favorable excerpts from U.S.
Supreme Court decisions in order to strike down the law, contrary to the
result in Barnes.148 Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court used the
possibility of an unMarksable case to attempt to escape vertical stare
decisis. 
Following the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s ruling, the case reached
the U.S. Supreme Court.149 The Court was split 4–2–1–2 on the issue of
nude dancing, but this time, the Court was also faced with a lower court
that failed to follow Barnes.150 According to the plurality in Pap’s: 
After canvassing [the separate opinions in Barnes], the
Pennsylvania court concluded that, although it is permissible to
find precedential effect in a fragmented decision, to do so a 
majority of the Court must have been in agreement on the concept
that is deemed to be the holding. The Pennsylvania court noted
that “aside from the agreement by a majority of the Barnes Court 
that nude dancing is entitled to some First Amendment protection,
we can find no point on which a majority of the Barnes Court
agreed.” Accordingly, the court concluded that “no clear
precedent arises out of Barnes on the issue of whether the [Erie]
ordinance . . . passes muster under the First Amendment.”151 
The plurality then seemed to endorse the Pennsylvania court’s view that
Barnes was unMarksable: “[A]lthough no five Members of the Court
agreed on a single rationale [for the conclusion in Barnes] . . . [w]e now
clarify that government restrictions on public nudity such as the ordinance
at issue here should be evaluated under the framework set forth in
O’Brien.”152 
The plurality did not go so far as to say that Barnes was not
precedent.153 In fact, the plurality appeared to reinforce the vertical stare 
148. Id. at 359–64.
149. City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 280 (2000).
150. Id. at 283.
151. Id. at 285–86 (internal citations omitted).
152. Id. at 289.
153. In fact, Barnes could be construed as a Marks precedent by looking at the
least common denominator of the logic of the Barnes opinions: “As a logical 
consequence of their approval of morality justifications for regulations of speech,
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O’Connor and Justice Kennedy implicitly agreed
with Justice Souter that governmental efforts to control the harmful secondary
effects associated with adult entertainment can serve as a basis for restricting
activities that enjoy First Amendment protection.” Triplett Grille, Inc. v. City of
Akron, 40 F.3d 129, 134 (6th Cir. 1994).
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68 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
decisis effect, at least as to the result in Barnes: “[T]he Pennsylvania court
adopted the dissent’s view in Barnes [which upheld the statute]. . . . A 
majority of the Court rejected that view in Barnes, and we do so again
here.”154 The concurrence from Justices Scalia and Thomas also hinted at
some precedential weight of Barnes. The concurring opinion mentioned,
almost in passing, “The city of Erie self-consciously modeled its ordinance
on the public nudity statute we upheld against constitutional challenge
in [Barnes], calculating (one would have supposed reasonably) that the
courts of Pennsylvania would consider themselves bound by our judgment
on a question of federal constitutional law.”155 
Overall, the Pap’s Court appeared to mostly ignore the Marks question 
presented by Barnes in favor of clarifying a holding for nude dancing
cases. In this attempt to clarify, the Court fractured once again but was 
likely successful in forming a rule through the Marks doctrine. The Pap’s
Court secured five Justices who agreed that (1) nude dancing was
expressive speech and (2) regulations on nude dancing should be analyzed
with the O’Brien test in the context of the state’s interest in combatting
secondary effects of nude dancing. Justices O’Connor, Rehnquist,
Kennedy, and Breyer joined in a plurality opinion that endorsed Justice
Souter’s opinion in Barnes—that nude dancing is expressive speech and
regulations on nude dancing target secondary effects for purposes of the
O’Brien test. Although Justice Souter did not join this aspect of the Pap’s
opinion to create a majority opinion, he did reason in concurrence:
[I] agree with the analytical approach that the plurality employs in
deciding this case. Erie’s stated interest in combating the
secondary effects associated with nude dancing establishments is
an interest unrelated to the suppression of expression under United
States v. O’Brien, . . . and the city’s regulation is thus properly
considered under the O’Brien standards.156 
Thus, under a straightforward Marks analysis, five justices agreed
with the above proposition. The Pap’s Court reinforced both vertical stare
decisis and horizontal stare decisis by reversing the Pennsylvania Court
and supplying a clearer holding consistent with Barnes.
154. Pap’s, 529 U.S. at 292.
155. Id. at 307.
156. Id. at 310.
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692021] OVERRULING LOUISIANA
B. Apodaca v. Oregon: A One-of-a-Kind unMarksable Case
Although the Pap’s Court declined to fully engage in a Marks analysis
for Barnes, Apodaca appears to truly fall outside of the Marks doctrine.
Whether a case is subject to the Marks doctrine results in an inquiry
regarding precedential weight. This Marks and precedential-weight
inquiry sheds light on which opinions in Ramos are correct and, more
importantly, on the weight and extent of June Medical as a precedent.
As previously discussed, the Apodaca majority was achieved through
the vote of Justice Powell.157 Marks instructs that the precedent of a split
majority is the concurring opinion that solves the legal issues on the
narrowest grounds.158 The Apodaca majority found that the Sixth
Amendment did not require unanimous juries in criminal trials.159 As a 
threshold issue, however, Justice Powell found that the Sixth Amendment
does indeed require unanimous juries in criminal trials.160 Therefore, 
Justice Powell’s opinion does not contain nested logic or a partially
overlapping rationale of the plurality that is typically required for an
implicit-consensus Marks analysis.161 For example, if Justice Powell’s 
opinion had said that the Sixth Amendment does not require unanimous
juries, like the plurality, but then outlined specific exceptions to that rule, 
then his rationale would partially overlap with the rationale of the
plurality.
Another common Marks approach is the fifth-vote rule, which allows
a lower court to simply use the deciding Justice’s concurring opinion and
assume it is the narrowest ground.162 This approach also does not work
well with Apodaca. Justice Powell endorsed a dual-track theory of
incorporation that the Court had already decided as a majority was
157. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 366, 366 (1972).
158. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
159. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 412 (1972), abrogated by Ramos v.
Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020).
160. Johnson, 406 U.S. at 371.
161. See Williams, supra note 117, at 809; see also Re, Beyond the Marks
Rule, supra note 126, at 1980–84 (describing the “logical subset” approach).
162. See Williams, supra note 117, at 813–15; see also Re, Beyond the Marks
Rule, supra note 126, at 1977–80 (describing the “median opinion” approach). In
Apodaca, it might seem possible, at least on the surface, to justify Justice Powell’s
concurrence as the narrowest grounds since his “view is narrower in the sense that
he would find that a nonunanimous verdict is constitutionally permissible—the 
result of Apodaca—in fewer cases than the other Justices concurring in the
judgment.” Varsava, supra note 106, at 123. But for the reasons offered in the text
we ultimately think that not even this tack is plausible when it comes to Apodaca.
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70 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
inapplicable to Sixth Amendment jury trials.163 As a result, the fifth-vote
approach would allow Justice Powell, writing for himself, to overturn a
prior decision of the Court.164 The fifth-vote approach is already
controversial for its concentration of power in one justice.165 This
approach is even more unworkable when that one justice uses a rationale
already rejected by the Court, as in Apodaca. In other words, when a
justice relies on a foregone doctrine, the fifth-vote approach is especially
untenable. Justice Gorsuch appears to critique the fifth-vote approach in
Ramos, which suggests that he believed the fifth-vote approach to be the
only Marks approach to discern a holding in Apodaca.166 
The final Marks approach is the issue-by-issue approach.167 This
approach requires one to parse all opinions for a majority agreement but is
controversial because it gives weight to dissenting opinions.168 
Nevertheless, this approach is also unworkable for Apodaca. When
counting the votes based on the issues, three results arise along with
serious contradictions:
(1) the Sixth Amendment guarantees the same rights in federal
and state trials—8 votes: 4 from the plurality and 4 from the
dissents;
163. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1402 (plurality opinion) (“Justice Powell reached a
different result only by relying on a dual-track theory of incorporation that a
majority of the Court had already rejected (and continues to reject).”). The full
incorporation of the right to trial by jury began in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 155 (1968).
164. This problem was identified in Ramos. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1402.
165. “Perhaps most controversially, the fifth vote approach treats as
binding all aspects of the opinion reflecting the median Justice’s views, including
propositions that no other participating Justice explicitly or implicitly assented
to.” Williams, supra note 117, at 815. “More fundamentally, the median opinion
approach paradoxically ascribes precedential force to minority opinions that all
other Justices have declined to join. In fact, the median opinion approach often
supports rules that most Justices actively oppose.” Re, Beyond the Marks Rule,
supra note 126, at 1978.
166. “And to accept [Justice Powell’s reasoning in Apodaca] as precedential,
we would have to embrace a new and dubious proposition: that a single Justice
writing only for himself has the authority to bind this Court to propositions it has
already rejected. This is not the rule, and for good reason—it would do more to
destabilize than honor precedent.” Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1402.
167. Williams, supra note 117, at 817; see also Re, Beyond the Marks Rule,
supra note 126, at 1988–93 (describing the “all opinions” approach).
168. Id.
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712021] OVERRULING LOUISIANA
(2) the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to unanimous
verdicts in federal trials—5 votes: 1 from the concurrence and
4 from the dissents; and 
(3) the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee the right to
unanimous verdicts in state trials—5 votes: 4 from the
plurality and 1 from the concurrence.169 
These three propositions cannot all coexist without contradiction.170 
For example, the four dissenters in Apodaca agreed that the Sixth
Amendment required unanimous juries.171 Justice Powell also endorsed
this idea at least in part. Thus, an essential proposition of the dissenters 
would win under the issue-by-issue approach even though the proposition
was squarely at odds with the result of the case. Furthermore, the
dissenters and the majority both reject Justice Powell’s dual-track-
incorporation rationale. Therefore, there is no issue consensus capable of
forming a workable holding. Even where there was majority agreement,
Apodaca does not work with the issue-by-issue approach since this
approach would give too much weight to dissenters for propositions that
the majority for the result rejected.
Apodaca’s complete failure under Marks makes it one of the premier
examples of an unMarksable case. Yet, a case’s status as unMarksable
does not completely erase its value as precedent. In Ramos, Justice Alito
recognized as a legal matter that Apodaca cannot be a non-precedent.172 
Justice Alito’s assertion is true, at least in precedent’s most basic form:
“[A] decided case that furnishes a basis for determining later cases
involving similar facts or issues.”173 Indeed, cases that lack clear reasoning 
exist, and numerous jurists recognize that there is at least some
precedential force in such decisions.174 Therefore, Apodaca, at the very 
169. Varsava, supra note 106, at 128.
170. Id.
171. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 414–15 (1972).
172. “It is remarkable that it is even necessary to address this question, but in
Part IV–A of the principal opinion, three Justices take the position that Apodaca
was never a precedent. The only truly fitting response to this argument is: 
‘Really?’” Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1427–28 (2020) (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
173. Precedent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
174. Cross and Harris’s work on precedent in English law highly endorses
ratio decidendi as inseparable from precedent; however, even they recognize
precedential force when a rationale is not articulated: “It would be a mistake to
assume that such decisions necessarily lack a ratio decidendi which enables them
to be cited as a precedent, for a proposition of law on which they must have been
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72 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
least, was precedent as to its result tied to material facts. Accordingly, a
defendant’s conviction was constitutional when convicted in state court by
ten out of twelve jurors.175 
Justice Gorsuch overlooked this principle of precedent when rejecting
Apodaca as a precedent. Although Justice Gorsuch’s approach to reject
Apodaca as a precedent may be normatively desirable to eliminate unclear
precedent, his approach rejecting results stare decisis is legally incorrect.
Justice Gorsuch attempts to address the hurdles of results stare decisis,
opining that Apodaca’s reasoning is entangled in the result particularly to
extract the requirement that the conviction be in state court.176 Yet Justice 
Gorsuch is necessarily tying a ratio decidendi to the written opinions of
the Apodaca justices. As discussed previously, the written opinions of the
Apodaca justices are unworkable—there is no ratio decidendi—but this
does not erase all precedential force. The material facts of Apodaca, 
including the fact of a state court conviction, combined with the result are
what yield the state court requirement. As such, the justices in Ramos that
recognized Apodaca as precedent despite Apodaca being unMarksable
were correct. Furthermore, Apodaca was arguably weak precedent from
the start, as several justices in the Ramos plurality asserted. This weak
precedential force combined with the flexibility of horizontal stare decisis
made Apodaca ripe for overruling and the result of Ramos more
foreseeable.
Apodaca’s uniqueness both in its very nature and its treatment in
Ramos may make it a one-off case. By its nature, Apodaca is unMarksable
as a case that cannot be analyzed without absurd results under the 
traditional views of Marks, including implicit consensus, the fifth-vote
rule, and the issue-by-issue approach. Apodaca (1) did not have nested
based may be inferred with more or less confidence from the facts coupled with
the conclusion.” CROSS & HARRIS, supra note 114. “In the American system of
stare decisis, the result and the reasoning each independently have precedential 
force, and courts are therefore bound to follow both the result and the reasoning
of a prior decision.” Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1416 n.6 (Kavanaugh J., concurring).
175. Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 406, abrogated by Ramos, 140 S. Ct. 1390.
Apodaca’s related case from Louisiana would adjust the juror requirement to nine
out of ten. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972), abrogated by Ramos, 140 
S. Ct. 1390 (2020).
176. “Where does the convenient ‘state court’ qualification come from?
Neither the Apodaca plurality nor the dissent included any limitation like that— 
their opinions turned on the meaning of the Sixth Amendment. What the dissent 
characterizes as Apodaca’s result turns out to be nothing more than Justice
Powell’s reasoning about dual-track incorporation dressed up to look like a logical
proof.” Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1404 (plurality opinion).
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732021] OVERRULING LOUISIANA
logic, so there was no implicit consensus; (2) would overrule a major legal
premise by way of one justice through the fifth vote; and (3) would
necessarily cause the dissent to win if individually counting the logic of
all justices. These circumstances seem rare, although it is possible that
another case either presently or in the future could include similar
conditions to Apodaca. However, by its treatment in Ramos as a non-
precedent, Apodaca is certainly a one-off case. If Justice Gorsuch’s
opinion provides authority for the existence of non-precedent from a
fractured decision, it should be emphasized that the Justice’s opinion
narrowly confines its reasoning to Apodaca. Justice Gorsuch makes only
one exception to binding precedent: Apodaca, wherein the deciding fifth
vote relied on a foregone constitutional doctrine.
IV. THE LEGACY OF RAMOS AND JUNE MEDICAL
Ramos offers an in-depth look at the Supreme Court’s view of
precedent and stare decisis. With the Ramos framework in mind, the
question remains of June Medical’s precedential weight. June Medical, as
a 4–1–4 decision, constitutes a Marks precedent. Chief Justice Roberts’s
vote in June Medical can be nested within the logic of the plurality. Unlike
in Apodaca, the Chief Justice’s opinion does not split with the plurality on
fundamental legal issues or embrace shaky legal theories. Accordingly,
Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence in June Medical is an “implicit 
consensus,” not a “fifth vote.”
Justice Breyer’s plurality opinion in June Medical reviewed both the
district court and court of appeals’ applications of WWH, in which there
was a five-vote majority opinion.177 Thus, the plurality in June Medical
acknowledged the precedential effect of WWH, and in applying WWH, 
embraced it as controlling under horizontal stare decisis. Likewise, Chief
Justice Roberts based his concurring opinion on the doctrine of stare
decisis.178 The Chief Justice’s opinion accords with the plurality to the 
extent that both opinions agree that the precedential effect of WWH affects 
the outcome in June Medical.
The wrinkle of Chief Justice Roberts’s concurring opinion comes from
his clarification of the Casey test and the June Medical plurality’s cost-
benefit analysis. Although the plurality construed WWH’s holding as
introducing a cost-benefit analysis, the Chief Justice reaffirmed the undue-
burden test from Casey and clarified that in Casey, “benefits” are
considered only in the context of the state’s burden to show whether a law
177. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2113 (2020).
178. Id. at 2133–35 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
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74 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
is reasonably related to a state’s legitimate purpose for the law.179 The 
Chief Justice’s wrinkle, however, is not wholly inconsistent with the
plurality opinion. Justice Breyer’s plurality would still endorse the undue-
burden Casey test and respect the result of WWH.
Indeed, the Chief Justice’s concurring opinion is the narrowest
grounds for deciding June Medical. Chief Justice Roberts first accepted
stare decisis as governing the decision, which was consistent with the
rationale of the plurality. He then clarified that in WWH the Court was not
introducing any new tests on top of Casey. By reaffirming Casey without 
the introduction of new tests, the Chief Justice’s concurrence provides the
narrowest grounds because it does not make new law and is a logical
subset of the plurality opinion. June Medical is a Marks precedent in which
vertical stare decisis will inexorably bind lower courts. The circuit courts 
have already begun analyzing June Medical under Marks somewhat
successfully. 
In Hopkins v. Jegley, the Eighth Circuit reviewed a district court’s
decision to grant a preliminary injunction regarding four restrictions on
abortion.180 None of the restrictions included an admitting-privileges
law.181 The Eighth Circuit found that Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence
in June Medical was controlling under Marks.182 As a result, the Eighth
Circuit vacated the district court’s injunction and remanded the case back
to the district court to engage in the undue-burden test from Casey rather 
than a cost-benefit analysis.183 Thus, the Hopkins court, the first circuit
court to analyze June Medical, found that June Medical was a Marks
precedent and faithfully applied Chief Justice Roberts’s concurring
opinion.
Similarly, in EMW Women’s Surgical Center, P.S.C. v. Friedlander, 
the Sixth Circuit reviewed a district court’s decision to grant a permanent
injunction regarding licensing requirements on abortion facilities, 
including hospital-admittance agreements and ambulance agreements.184 
179. Id. at 2120, 2138.
180. Hopkins v. Jegley, 968 F.3d 912, 913–14 (8th Cir. 2020).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 915 (“Chief Justice Roberts’s vote was necessary in holding
unconstitutional Louisiana’s admitting-privileges law, so his separate opinion is
controlling); see Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977) (explaining that 
when “no single rationale explaining the result [of a case] enjoys the assent of five
Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those
Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds’”).
183. Id. at 915–16.
184. EMW Women’s Surgical Center, P.S.C. v. Friedlander, 978 F.3d 418,
418 (6th Cir. 2020).
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752021] OVERRULING LOUISIANA
The Sixth Circuit determined that a Marks analysis was necessary to
determine the holding of June Medical.185 In order to tackle the “narrowest
grounds” as required by Marks, the court used the nested-logic 
approach.186 Furthermore, the court found that when a law is struck down
as unconstitutional, the concurrence’s nested logic must “invalidate the
fewest laws going forward.”187 Applying this framework, the Sixth Circuit
determined that Chief Justice Roberts’s concurring opinion was nested
logic because “[l]ike the Chief Justice, the plurality would invalidate any
law with ‘the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman’s choice’ to obtain a previability abortion.”188 Moreover, the court
stated, “Because all laws invalid under the Chief Justice’s rationale are
invalid under the plurality’s, but not all laws invalid under the plurality’s
rationale are invalid under the Chief Justice’s, the Chief Justice’s position
is the narrowest under Marks.”189 Thus, the Sixth Circuit correctly
concluded that June Medical was a Marks precedent and that the Chief
Justice’s concurring opinion controlled.
In contrast, a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit in Whole Woman’s
Health v. Paxton found that June Medical was not a Marks precedent and
applied the WWH cost-benefit analysis.190 The Fifth Circuit found no
nested logic in Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence because “accounting
only for a law’s burdens [under the Chief Justice’s test] renders it
impossible to perform [the plurality’s] balancing test, which necessarily
entails weighing two sides against each other.”191 The court then found
that June Medical was not “a controlling rule of law” and proceeded to
apply the cost-benefit test of WWH.192 The court, however, failed to fully
analyze the nature of the nested-logic or logical-subset approach to Marks. 
This shortcoming was highlighted and correctly applied in Judge Willett’s
dissenting opinion. The dissenting opinion uses the following illustration
and commentary to show nested logic:
185. Id. at 431.
186. Id. (“In a fractured decision where two opinions concur in the judgment,
an opinion will be the narrowest under Marks if the instances in which it would
reach the same result in future cases form ‘a logical subset’ of the instances in
which the other opinion would reach the same result.”) (internal citations
omitted).
187. Id. at 432.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 433.
190. Whole Woman’s Health v. Paxton, 978 F.3d 896, 904 (5th Cir. 2020).
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
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76 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
The larger circle (B) is the June Medical plurality’s “grand
‘balancing test’” to determine undue burden. The subset (A) is the
Chief Justice’s narrower test, which focuses only on half of the
plurality’s test: the burden part. Simply put, the tests have a
common denominator—substantial obstacle—and the Chief
Justice’s agreement with the plurality’s substantial-obstacle
analysis is the “narrowest position supporting the judgment.”193 
Judge Willett’s dissent demonstrates that Justice Breyer’s plurality
opinion does—at least impliedly—still endorse the Casey test and that the
Chief Justice’s concurring opinion is narrower by not adding additional
tests to the default substantial-obstacle test. Therefore, the dissent
correctly concluded that June Medical is a Marks precedent where Chief
Justice Roberts’s concurring opinion provides the controlling rationale. A 
plurality of the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, subsequently adopted Judge
Willet’s rationale as it pertains to the Marks analysis.194 
In addition to its vertical stare decisis effects in the circuit courts, June 
Medical also offers insight into horizontal stare decisis. It would constitute
a mistake to read Chief Justice Roberts’s change from minority in WWH
to majority in June Medical as simply a wholesale switch, because what
was not a precedent in 2016 when he dissented in WWH was a precedent
193. Id. at 918 (internal citations omitted).
194. Whole Woman’s Health v. Paxton, 10 F.4th 430, 478 (5th Cir. 2021) (en
banc).
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772021] OVERRULING LOUISIANA
in 2020.195 That “switch” reading would work if the Chief Justice had 
joined Justice Breyer’s opinion for the Court in June Medical. However,
the Chief Justice’s adherence to horizontal stare decisis may not have been
as strong as it seems. Although it is true that the Chief Justice honored
results stare decisis, his separate opinion in June Medical reveals serious
doubts as to his adherence to the reasoning in the opinion of WWH— 
unsurprising doubts too, as he had dissented in the Texas case. In fact, we
do not think anyone expects, at least as a general rule of stare decisis, that
a justice of the Supreme Court who had voted in dissent in a previous case 
will switch his vote and join what was then the majority in a future case in
order to fully honor horizontal stare decisis. If overruling is within bounds,
why should a justice switch his or her vote in a case when the opportunity
arises to overrule a recent precedent in which that justice had dissented? 
Nevertheless, that justice will “begin with the presumption that we
will follow precedent,”196 but he or she may find that that presumption
needs to be turned around, in which case the justice in question “has an
obligation to provide an explanation for [his or her] decision.”197 So if
Chief Justice Roberts, who “continue[d] to believe that the case [WWH] 
was wrongly decided,”198 had decided to join the dissenters in June 
Medical and overrule WWH, that decision would have been in itself
unobjectionable from the perspective of horizontal stare decisis. Similarly,
if a new justice is appointed to the Supreme Court, no one could validly
suggest that past precedent indefinitely and inexorably binds that justice.
This is likely especially true when a new membership in the Court arises,
as is now the case with the recent additions of Justices Gorsuch,
Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Sooner or later these justices will certainly face
controversial precedents such as Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which had
not been challenged by the parties in June Medical.199 
195. Noah Feldman made a similar mistake when he wrote that in June 
Medical the Chief Justice “provided the decisive vote to affirm the right to
abortion as expressed in Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992).” Noah Feldman,
The Battle Over Scalia’s Legacy, THE N.Y. REV., Dec. 17, 2020 (reviewing
ANTONIN SCALIA, THE ESSENTIAL SCALIA: ON THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS,
AND THE RULE OF LAW (2020). In fact, as we pointed out, Casey was out of the
question in June Medical. See supra note 66. The true meaning of what the Chief
Justice in effect did in this case can only be understood in the light of the Marks
doctrine.
196. Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1432 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting).
197. Id.
198. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2133 (2020) (Roberts,
C.J., concurring in judgment).
199. See supra note 66.
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If, for example, there is a hypothetical 4–4 split in the Court about
whether to keep some past decision, the horizontal stare decisis doctrine
would not force a new justice to join the camp that votes for the upholding
of the precedent. He or she may and will cast the fifth vote as he or she
sees fit: whether “to stand by things decided” or in favor of overruling— 
obviously offering reasons for his or her decision. This idea of course
works both ways and is unrelated to an ideological preference as to the
results. In the abortion context, the claimed freedom for the fifth vote to
overrule may now favor the so-called “conservative” camp, given the
recent additions to the Court, but if Casey were overruled, it could become
the other way around in the future for incoming justices. In other contexts,
the same approach to horizontal stare decisis and overruling may favor the
“liberal” camp.
In June Medical, we know that Chief Justice Roberts, surely knowing
that he could have overruled WWH, instead chose not to. By concurring in
June Medical, he respected the result in WWH; by voting separately in
June Medical, he not only made sure that Justice Breyer’s proposed
opinion in this case would not become a majority opinion, and therefore
would not become controlling, but he was also able to introduce the
mentioned wrinkle that likely weakened significantly the precedential
value of WWH. Justice Alito observed this when, dissenting in June 
Medical, he indicated that the Chief Justice “votes to overrule Whole
Woman’s Health insofar as it changed the Casey test.”200 Never in his
opinion in June Medical does the Chief Justice allude to such an overruling
of WWH, or even less so does he admit it,201 but that overruling effect is
indeed the practical import of his concurring opinion in light of the Marks
doctrine.202 Thus, the Chief Justice and his pledge for stare decisis is true, 
up to a point. He struck down the Louisiana law in light of WWH, but he
was the first one to disregard the full horizontal precedential value of
WWH to the point that one of his dissenting colleagues called the Chief
200. June Med., 140 S. Ct. at 2153 (Alito, J., dissenting).
201. Professor Re prefers to frame the problem in terms of “narrowing” the
precedent instead of “overruling” it. This is closer to Chief Justice Roberts’ own
understanding of what he was doing with WWH in June Medical. See
Re, Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court, supra note 119, at 1889 
(contrasting the standard for “legitimate narrowing” with the stricter standard for
overruling); see also Re, Precedent as Permission, supra note 14. 
202. Note that what Justice Gorsuch said in Ramos of Justice Powell’s opinion 
in Apodaca (that it would be wrong to afford “a single Justice writing only for
himself . . . the authority to bind this Court to propositions it has already rejected”)
cannot be said of the Chief Justice’s vote in June Medical. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 
1430. As previously explained, the Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion is nested logic.
360570-LSU_82-1_Text.indd  83 11/19/21  12:00 PM




   
  











   
  
 










   
   






     
792021] OVERRULING LOUISIANA
Justice’s opinion the “overruling” of WWH—a case in which there had
been a majority opinion, unlike June Medical.203 As a result, horizontal
stare decisis was respected in a sense, but vertical stare decisis was
changed by way of Marks.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s 2020 term offered a unique glimpse into the
Court’s views on precedent. The High Court grappled with the vertical and
horizontal dimensions of stare decisis and even offered extraordinarily rare
commentary on the Marks doctrine. The Court’s discussion of precedent
includes support for our framework of precedent. Vertical stare decisis is,
indeed, afforded binding weight. However, it is evident that horizontal
stare decisis and an application of its weight can be a much more difficult
question. Nevertheless, the Court clearly recognized some obligation to
follow horizontal precedent in both Ramos and June Medical. Indeed, the 
Court began in both cases with addressing its prior case law. Yet, the Court
diverged, mainly for policy reasons, on whether to follow prior precedent,
and in the case of Ramos, whether certain prior cases at the horizontal level
are precedent at all. Despite the Ramos plurality’s problematic
introduction of possible non-precedent, the idea of non-precedent is likely
narrowly confined to the situation in Apodaca, if it exists at all. Although
the Marks doctrine introduces difficulties of its own when analyzing a split
opinion, it is clear from the Court’s 2020 session that the doctrine is alive 
and well. 
Furthermore, the interaction between horizontal stare decisis and
Marks yielded the rather enigmatic decision in June Medical. While results 
stare decisis raises questions about the viability of admitting-privileges 
laws in the abortion context, Chief Justice Roberts’s concurring opinion
certainly qualifies June Medical as a Marks precedent, and as is already
evident, the perceived precedential effect of WWH has been weakened. In
light of the effect of the Marks doctrine, the question remains how much
further the Court can take the idea of seemingly honoring horizontal
precedent while at the same time exercising its freedom to deviate from
prior decisions.
203. June Med., 140 S. Ct. at 2153 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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